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ARGUMENT 
ISSUE #1: A. Roberts' Disclosures Were Untimely and Insufficient 
Hansen argued that Roberts' expert disclosures were untimely and insufficient. In 
response, Roberts did not dispute that Roberts' rule 26(b)( 4) disclosures were not made 
until after the close of discovery and only weeks before trial. Further, Roberts did not 
dispute that he failed to disclose the identity of one expert, John Droge, until just two 
weeks before trial and two and a-half months after expert disclosures were due pursuant 
to the trial court's scheduling order. 
Roberts argues that this Court should find the disclosures timely because Roberts 
was still conducting discovery after the expert disclosure deadlines and after the close of 
discovery. However, Roberts' timing issues are due solely to the late start he made to 
begin discovery in earnest. Roberts failed to explain to this Court that he did not file a 
notice to depose Hansen until August 18, 2010, nine days after the discovery cutoff 
deadline. See R. Vol. I, p. 86. 
Roberts admitted that Hansen responded to written discovery on March 11, 2010, 
but provides no explanation as to why he waited over five months and until after the 
discovery cutoff to conduct depositions and follow up on discovery responses he felt 
were insufficient. Roberts disingenuously states that his decision to wait five months, 
and until after the discovery cutoff, to start discovery in earnest was Hansen's fault. The 
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fault for the delay rests squarely on Roberts' shoulders for failing to conduct discovery 
before the discovery cutoff deadline and before his expert disclosure deadline. 
Roberts also incorrectly suggested that he could unilaterally "reserve the right" to 
file late expert disclosures because his experts were rebuttal experts. Roberts' position is 
incorrect because his experts were not rebuttal experts and he has no right to unilaterally 
change the court's scheduling order. Roberts filed a counterclaim seeking damages to his 
vehicle and, in addition, raised affirmative defenses of comparative fault and pre-existing 
injuries. Roberts had the burden of proving that Hansen was legally liable to Roberts to 
recover the damages he sought as well as to prove his affirmative defenses. Accordingly, 
the expert witnesses he called were not rebuttal witnesses but witnesses who testified in 
Roberts' case in chief to prove his counterclaim and affirmative defenses. See Aguilar v. 
Coonrod, 262 P.2d 671, 677 (Idaho 2011) (affirming trial court decision to exclude 
untimely disclosed expert who intended to testifY to prove an affirmative defense). 
Roberts' response also completely failed to address the standard of review - an 
abuse of discretion - and show how the trial court's decision was not an abuse of 
discretion. When determining whether a district court abused its discretion, this Court 
considers three factors: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion, (2) whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently 
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with applicable legal principles, and (3) whether it reached its decision through an 
exercise of reason. See Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (Idaho 2006). 
When the issue of timeliness of expert disclosures was addressed by the court 
below, Roberts' counsel made the conclusory statement that, "I believe they were 
disclosed timely." Tr. Vol. I., p. 333, L. 12 The trial court then made the conclusory 
ruling: "All right. They will be allowed to testifY." 
The trial court clearly did not meet any of the three required prongs to show that it 
did not abuse its discretion by allowing expert testimony from witnesses whose 
disclosures were not timely. Accordingly, judgment should be vacated and the case 
remanded for a new trial 
B. Kimbrough Invaded the Province of the Jury 
Hansen argued that the trial court erred in allowing Kimbrough to testifY about 
whether Hansen was negligent because it is inappropriate to allow an expert to provide 
testimony on subjects that are not beyond the common sense of the average juror. In 
response, Roberts argues that Hansen failed to object during the trial testimony so he 
waived the right to challenge the admissibility of the evidence on appeal. 
Hansen did object during Kimbrough's trial testimony, just as it began, and sought 
and received a continuing objection that his testimony invaded the province of the jury: 
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Q By Ms. Brizee: Dr. Kimbrough, what did you do in this case? 
A Tried to reconstruct the accident. So, for example, 
Mr. Gordon: Objection, Your Honor. Can I make an objection to all his 
testimony as to invading the province of the jury? 
THE COURT: You have a continuing objection. 
See Tr. Vol. I., p. 353 L. 19 through 354 L. 1. 
Roberts notes that Kimbrough's opinion testimony was that the crash took place 
because of a "careless right-hand turn by the plaintiff' and that Kimbrough's opinion was 
based on Kimbrough's opinion of what Roberts was thinking at the time he passed 
Hansen on the right. See Br. 12 and 13. Such opinion testimony, as discussed in 
Hansen's initial brief, is inadmissible. 
The trial court erred by allowing Kimbrough to testifY as to who, in his opinion, 
was at fault for causing the crash because such testimony invades the province of the jury 
and is not helpful. 
C. The Issue Regarding Droge's Testimony is Moot 
Hansen argued that the trial court erred in allowing Droge testifY because Roberts 
failed to provide adequate foundation that Droge's testimony was scientifically reliable. 
In response, Roberts argues that Droge's testimony is moot since the jury found Hansen 
negligent and Droge's testimony only went to causation of injuries. 
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Hansen agrees with Roberts that Droge's testimony only addressed causation of 
InJunes. That said, it is, at the very least, interesting to learn about the unreliable 
methodology used to support Droge's testimony and the body of case law that supports 
exclusion of such testimony. Given the unscientific methodology employed by Droge, it 
is now apparent why Roberts did not disclose the basis and methodology used to support 
Droge's opinion that a violent crash that caused significant damage to the vehicles 
involved would translate to extremely minimal forces to the passengers. Obviously, 
providing the methodology, basis, and facts supporting Droge's opinions, as required by 
rule 26(b)( 4), would bring transparency and light to the unscientific opinions and would 
allow counsel to effectively cross examine Droge. The information that Hansen elicited 
from Droge during cross examination - which was not provided in the rule 26(b)( 4) 
disclosures - highlights the problems caused by Roberts' untimely and incomplete 
disc I osures. 
ISSUE #2: The trial court erred in ruling that Hansen waived the 
objections he made during Roberts' video deposition. 
Hansen argued that the trial court erred when it ruled that Hansen waived the 
objections he made during Roberts' video deposition by not addressing those objections 
during a hearing that was scheduled to review jury instructions. In response, Roberts 
concedes that a hearing was not set for the sole purpose of addressing the parties' 
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objections and that at no time did the trial court invite Hansen or order Hansen to raise 
his objections to the deposition during the hearing set to review jury instructions. Thus, 
the trial court was clearly wrong when it concluded that Hansen waived the right to raise 
his objections at trial. 
Hansen had the right under rule 32(b) to raise his objections at trial. See Idaho 
R. Civ. P. 32(b) (noting that "objection may be made at the trial ... to receiving in 
evidence any deposition ... for any reason which would require the exclusion of the 
evidence if the witness were then present and testifYing."). Roberts argues that the rule 
does not apply to video depositions because video depositions need to be edited prior to 
trial. Roberts provides absolutely no legal authority whatsoever to support his argument 
and the rules of civil procedure clearly contradict Roberts' position. 
If Roberts wanted to edit the video prior to trial then he should have asked the 
trial court to rule on all of the objections raised during the depositions. Roberts cannot 
blame Hansen for waiting to trial to raise his objections when the rule clearly allows him 
to do so. 
Roberts then argues that the hearsay documents of Roberts' vehicle damage was 
admissible; that Roberts' out of court statements were not hearsay; and that he did not 
violate the court's prior ruling by testifYing that he did not receive a citation. 
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Roberts argues that the documents he submitted regarding the repair estimates 
for his vehicle are admissible because Hansen testified as to the amount of his vehicle 
damage and because Roberts made a statement about what he remembered he was told by 
the mechanic as to how much his repairs would cost. Roberts did not object to Hansen 
stating the amount of his vehicle repairs but if he did, the trial court, if acting properly, 
would have sustained the objection. See Philips v. Erhart, 254 P.3d 1 (Idaho 2011) 
(holding that objections to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and that 
hearsay evidence admitted without objection is as strong as any other legally competent 
evidence). Further, Roberts' statement about what the mechanic told him about the 
amount of repair charges is still hearsay because it is based on the out-of-court statement 
made by the mechanic. 
Roberts argues that his own statements that were made out-of-court and offered 
during his examination by his own counsel are not hearsay. The rule is clear that a 
statement is not hearsay only if it was (1) offered against a party and (2) is that party's 
own statement. See Idaho R. Evid. 80 l( d)(2). Roberts' statements were not offered 
against Roberts, but for him, so the statements are hearsay. See State v. Gerrardo, 147 
Idaho 22 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009) (holding that trial court misunderstood the hearsay 
definition when it allowed a statement by Gonzales, a party to the case, to be used against 
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Gerardo, who was also a party to the case, because the statement, to not be considered 
hearsay, could only be offered against the party making the statement). 
Finally, Roberts argues that his statement that he did not receive a citation was 
not objectionable even though the trial court had ordered the parties not to present 
testimony about citations. Roberts' argument that the court order concerning the citation 
was extremely narrow and that Hansen should have expanded the motion in limine to 
include testimony about whether Roberts received a citation is disingenuous because 
Roberts specifically asked the trial court for guidance on the scope of its ruling and 
indicated that she would like to ask Roberts whether he received a citation along with the 
police officer and Kimbrough. 
Roberts' Counsel: "With Matt Roberts, my plan was to ask him: Did you 
receive a citation as a result of this accident? And he'll say, no, because he 
didn't. Mr. Hansen got the citation. Can I ask him that question? It's not-
that's not dealing with Mr. Hansen, whether or not he received or didn't 
receive a citation, but it's kind of linked, so I thought I better bring it up 
with the Court while we're talking about this." 
See Tr. Vol. L, p. 47 L. 24 through 49 L. 5. 
The trial court ruled: "I'm going to grant the motion to the extent that it deals with 
testimony and/or admission of the citation." See Tr. Vol. 1., p. 51 L. 18. The trial court 
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then went on to clarifY that his ruling extended to all witnesses mentioning the citation 
but that he would allow the police officer and accident reconstructionist to testifY about 
factual circumstances: "I would bar any comment concerning the citation itself by either 
the officer or the reconstruction expert." See Tr. Vol. I., p. 53 L. 8. 
Thus, Roberts' suggestion that the trial court's ruling was only narrowly limited 
to testimony of Hansen is wrong and Roberts sought and obtained clarification from the 
trial court as to the scope of the ruling and the trial court clearly extended the prohibition 
of testimony regarding the citation to all witnesses. 
Roberts's argument that Hansen's objection was not proper fails because Hansen 
was prohibited from objecting to the testimony at trial. Rule 32(b) allows Hansen to 
object to deposition testimony at trial but Hansen was precluded from doing so under the 
trial court's erroneous ruling. Thus, Roberts' arguments that Hansen had to object based 
on the violation of the court's order is wrong since Hansen was precluded from objecting 
in the first instance. 
Finally, Roberts' arguments that the error was harmless is wrong because no 
evidence whatsoever was presented to support Roberts' damages so the outcome of the 
case would certainly have been different if Roberts was precluded from introducing 
hearsay statements to prove his damages. Further, the allocation of fault would probably 
be significantly different if Roberts was prohibited from making self-serving hearsay 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 9 
statements and ifhe was prohibited from violating the court's order prohibiting testimony 
regarding citations. As noted in Hansen's initial brief, the jury was considering 
allocating fault 5l/49 but asked if it could award Roberts 90 percent of his damages. 
When the court said, "no," the jury then found Hansen 90 percent at fault so it could give 
Roberts, who it knew just underwent a liver transplant, money to repair his car. Since the 
case involves a claim and a counterclaim, any difference in the allocation of fault will 
make a difference in the amount Hansen has to pay to Roberts or may result in an award 
to Hansen if he is given a fair trial. 
ISSUE #3: Limitations on Voir Dire 
Hansen argued that the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Hansen from 
inquiring whether a prospective juror or one of his family members were or had ever 
been employed by an insurance carrier. In response, Roberts argued that Hansen did not 
raise the issue of whether he could inquire about potential juror's past employment with 
an insurance company until the day of trial and that by waiting until the day of trial, 
Hansen did not preserve the issue for appeal. However, the only case law cited in support 
of Roberts' argument state that an issue must be raised at trial to preserved on appeal and 
Hansen clearly sought permission to inquire about a potential juror's past employment 
before jury selection commenced so the issue was preserved. 
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A blanket rule prohibiting the mention of insurance at all prevents a plaintiff from 
discovering whether potential jurors is biased due to juror or the juror's family's 
employment with insurance companies. 
Issue #4: Roberts is not entitled to attorney fees. 
Roberts seeks fees, arguing that Hansen's appeal was frivolous. The request for 
fees is unsupported by any discussion as to what arguments it believes are frivolous. An 
unsupported and conclusory statement is not sufficient to provide this Court or Hansen 
with proper notice of the basis or reasoning supporting such a request and should be 
denied. See Idaho R. App. P. 35(5). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Hansen requests that this Court vacate the judgment in 
favor of Roberts and remand to the trial court for a new trial. 
DATED this 6th day of April, 2012. 
Brent Gordon 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on this 6th day of April, 2012, I faxed and caused two (2) true 
and correct copies of the foregoing instrument to be delivered to the following via U.S. 
Mail, postage prepaid: 
Jennifer K. Brizee 
POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC 
P.O. Box 1276 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1276 
Fax: (208) 733-5444 
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Brent Gordon 
